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1. North — South or something else
The first thing to emphasize is that the Code' is being drafted by state 
representatives, for adoption by states. This fact entails that those /ran.s- 
wa/ZonaZi'.s/. /¡'AeraZ or reroZM/fonary á/ea.s which envisage the reduction of the 
role of the state c/o no/ Aare -s/rony pos/ions' aro?ord /Ac neyo/i'a/rny tabled 
The Code will be state centric and wiii not appropriately consider the role 
of the TNCs in a global community not devided by state frontiers.
It could not be differently.^ I t  is revealing that it was a sovereign state. 
Chile, complaining against the massive interference of the International 
Telephone and Telegraph Company (ITT) which induced the intensive and 
systematic UN concern with the control of the TNC in 1972. The Secretary 
General appointed a Group of eminent persons, the report of which led to the 
establishment of the Commission on Transnational Corporations (ECOSOC 
Res. 1913 (LVII) of 5 December 1974) and of the Centre on Transnational 
Corporations (ECOSOC Res. 1908 (LVII) of 2 August 1974).* The Commis­
sion is composed of forty eight member states of the UN, thirty three from 
Latin America, Africa and Asia, ten from ,,Western European and other" 
states and five from the Socialist countries. The actual formulation of the 
Code is the work of an Intergovernmental Working Group, set up upon the 
Commission's recommendation. (COONROOD, 273) The steps taken to­
wards a, Code therefore are not simply the product of the demand ior a new 
international economic order (NIEO). The actions committed in furtherance 
of the NIEO certainly are closely linked with the efforts to control and 
regulate the activities of the TNC^ but the two are no/ ?dc??/ica7. This dis­
tinction may become important. The North — South dialogue, aimed at 
formulating the NIEO came to a stale-mate in the early 1980s. (NORTH — 
SOUTH, 28) According to the second report of the Brandt Commission, pub­
lished in 1983, the North — South dialogue needs a new start. (COMMON, 
142). Whether there will be a successful new round in the Noith — South dia­
logue remains to be seen. But if the goal of regulating the activities of 
the TNC is not merely a part of the NIEO. but a separate, relatively 
independent objective then the prospects for achieving it increase,
9*
since then the completion of the Code is not held hostage to the success of 
the NIEO.
The d^eren/m/fon at/A ia /Ac A'oa/A my he another reason for treating 
the case of the Code outside a simple North —South framework. Referring 
to the difference between t he African growth rate of 0.5 per cent in 1980 — 
1982 and the Asian one of 4.1 per cent (among low income countries, in 
both cases), <S. S'Ovmyc notices that the "line dividing North from South 
on the world map as shown on the cover of the [second) Brandt Report 
may not be so hard and fast as we thought." (STR ANGE, 270) The emerg­
ence of the newly industrializing countries, the political-ideological-stra­
tegic diversification of the Third W orld countries necessitates new para­
digms.*^  This new approach would take into account the various differenti­
ating factors among Third World states, such as their expanding role as 
home country for TNCs.
2. The provisions of the Code
How does all this apply to the text of the draft Code? Three points 
will be discussed.
A: Issues covered by other United Nations and specialized agency 
instruments;
B: Issues, essentially resolved;
C: Major outstanding issues.
A: /gave# rorered Ay o/Aer Una/ed Mdfon.? wid apecMtlited nyewy dorM- 
wcw/.s
Intergovernmental and nongovernmental attempts to regulate the ac­
tivities of the TNC mushroom wildly.' Yet. the drafters of the Code could 
only rely on documents adopted or under preparation within the UNfam- 
ily. There was agreement that instead of regulating employment and la­
bour relations the Code will refer to the Tripartite Declaration of Prin­
ciples concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy, adopted by 
the Governing Body of the International Labour Office, on 16 November 
1977. Similarly in respect to the problems of competiton and restrictive 
business practices, the Code will confine itself to a formula stating that: 
"For the pruposes of this Code, the relevant provisions of the Set of Multi- 
laterallv Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control of Restrictive 
Business Practices adopted by the General Assembly in its resolution 
35/63 of 5 December 1980 shall/should also apply in the field of restrictive 
business practices." (REPORT. 618)
Concerning the corrupt practices and the transfer of technology, no 
agreement has been reached yet. Some proposals contain substantial pro-
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visions on bot h areas, others simply refer to the international agreement on 
illicit payments and to the code of conduct on the transfer of technology.
Lor the sake of bravity. these documents will not be discussed in this 
paper.
В: Уззмез asseidthM?/ rewired
An issue is essentially resolved if the paragraph(s) of the draft contain 
no bracketed versions. The solution can either be in favour of the developing 
/host country or it can be impartial, fn the former case it requires a 
behaviour of the parties (home country, TNC, host country) which is in 
harmony with the demands of the LDCs. These demands can generally
be accociated with the ideasof dependence thinking.^ If the solution included
in the Code does not correspond to the demands of the LDCs, then it is 
impartial. Impartiality means that it is a compromise formula without anv 
bias to one of the three interest groups (developed countries, TNCs, LDCs)*" 
With the exception of paragraph 5f which protects the confidentialitv of 
the information furnished by the TNC to the authorities 1 have not found 
any Madfspided provision in the Code which would be more in keeping with 
the interests of either the developed/home states or the TNCs, than with 
the interests of the LDCs.
The number in the bracket refers to the paragraph(s) in the Code.
a) /a/ere.s'  ^ron/C'r/.s ?с/м'сА arc rewired ¿a/aroar q/'/Ac ADC'.s.
L'roaoM! ;'c waMer.s
Lhe TNC should not constitute an enclave, but establish meaning­
ful links with the local economy (25, 28. paragraph 28 has not been fully 
agreed upon yet.).
The TNC should not use transfer pricing to evade taxation and 
control measures (33, 34).
— The TNC should not worsen the balance of payment position of the 
host country but contribute to its improvement (26 -  32 But see also the 
impartial solutions.).
— Critical decisions should not be taken in headquarters, but in local 
branches with due respect to the host state's objectives (21, 23, 31).
— Local entities of the TNC should be informed about the plans of 
the parent company in due time and in appropriate detail (46).
— The TNC should promote the employment of local nationals at all 
levels (24).
— The TNC should supply to the competent authorities all informa­
tion required (44, 45).
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NocM/% Miadcns-
— The TNC should "avoid practices products or services which cause 
detrimental effects on cultural patterns and socio-cultural objectives as 
determined by the Governments" (12; the quotation is taken from the 
paragraph).
— The TNC should not collaborate with racist regimes in Southern 
Africa. (Agreement was reached upon the text of the paragraph, but it 
has not appeared in the Code yet. See: REPORT, 014)
— The TNC should not use its government to put pressure on another 
government (18, 65).
— The TNC should not seek the support of its government in vio­
lation of the principle of the exhaustion of local remedies (19).
— The TNC should cooperate with the government for the review 
or renegotiation of contracts concluded between them. (11. Part of para­
graph 11 is still disputed but it docs not prejudice the fact that the prin­
ciple of renegotiation is adopted.)
The states may regulate the entry and determine the role of the TNC 
in their economic development (47).
NorereiyMfy
— The TNC should act in conformity with the host country's devel­
opment plans and ¡policies, and "work seriously towards making a positive 
contribution" to them (9).
b) /n/cre.s/ coa/Victs /c /nc% Me Code q//ers aa MHparh'ai -soItdt'oM 
EcoaoMn'c wiader.s
— With respect to the balance of payment situation the TNC is 
allowed to impose restrictions on its entities and engage in activities on 
the local capital and money market within the generally accepted practices 
prevailing in the country (31. 32).
— The Code contains the requirement to protect the environment. 
This is not to be associated exclusively with either of the interest groups. 
I t is in the common interest and therefore an impartial regulation (41 -  43).
<S'occd MMider-s'
— The above said apply to the provisions on the respect for human 
rights and fundamental freedoms (13).
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Decision MoiiMy
— The TNCs should "not engage in political activities which are not 
permitted by the Jaws and established policies and administrative practices 
of the countries in which they operate." (16. This 16"' parapgraph can 
be considered impartial only because the act of interference in the internal 
affairs is regulated by another — the heavily disputed paragraph 15.)
¿'orereiynp/
— The relationship between the international business interests and 
the interests of the countries in which theTNC operates should be harmoni­
ous (22).
The Code contains further undisputed and impartial provisions. By 
and large the parts "Intergovernmental cooperation" (paragraphs 59 — 65) 
and "Implementation of the Code of conduct" (66 — 71) fall into this cate­
gory, with two qualifications: there is no agreement on the exact formula­
tion of the subject matter of the states' consultation (par. 62) and on the 
question whether the Commission on Transnational Corporations should be 
entitled to clarify provisions of the Code or not (par. 69(c)).
I shall comment on the undisputed (resolved) matters after the over­
view of the outstanding issues.
C : .!/ftyor oMMan&wy tagMeg tw, Me Code
DcoMormc oiode/.s
— There is disagreement whether the TNC should contribute to the 
balance of payment through diversification of imports — and not only 
through diversification of exports. Moreover some delegations think that 
this contribution depends upon the type of activities in which the TNC is 
engaged, whereas many other delegations are of the view that it should be 
governed by government regulations and policies (28).
Decision wa^iny
— There are differences concerning the phrasing of the non-interfer­
ence in interna! political affairs principle. The developing countries opt 
for a broad formula, the developed prefer a qualified one. prohibiting only 
"illegal" interference in interna! "political" affairs (15).
I t is also disputed whether a separate stipulation is needed to call upon 
the states to take action within their jurisdiction to prevent the TNC from 
such an interference (64).
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— The Report is enlightening on this point: "The fundamental diffi- 
culty in the formulation revolves around the scope of the national sover­
eignty in this regard. Most delegations have felt that the concept of perma­
nent sovereignty over natural resources, wealth and economic activities is a 
well established principle of international law reflected in a number of 
United Nations resolutions and should be reaffirmed in the code. Some del­
egations, how ever, have taken the position that acceptance of such a broad 
concept of national sovereignty would have to be qualified by reference to 
international law." (REPORT, 600; 6).
— With respect to the legal system of the country in which the TNC 
operates, the question is not solved whether the TNC should be subject 
only to the laws and regulations of the country or also to its administrative 
practices and jurisdiction (7).
— No solution has been found for the case of conflicting jurisdictions
(58).
There are three other persistent problems unresolved.
— JVah'oMM? /rea/wen/. Should entities of the TNC enjoy the same treat­
ment accorded to the domestic enterprises or not ? The developed market 
economy countries insist on non-discriminatory treatment, both the socialist 
and the developing states refuse it. The socialist states maintain that 
the principle is incompatible with their social and economic system, the 
developing countries think that national treatment, if applied indiscrimi­
nately, would be highly prejudicial to their development.
— NafioMaJtxafioM an<r/ The fundamental and long
standing difference of views between the developed market economy coun­
tries and the LDCs is reflected by the proposals put forward by them. The 
developed states'intention is to make reference to international law, to call 
for prompt, adequate and effective compensation and to enumerate further 
elements to be taken into account in assessing the compensation to be paid. 
The proposition of the LDCs claims that adequate compensation should 
be paid, taking into account the laws and regulations of the state that na­
tionalizes and all the circumstances that the state may deem relevant.
— q/ dAs/ndas. According to the LDCs, disputes between 
the TNC and the host country should be settled in the national courts of 
the host country. They oppose an explicit reference to arbitration. The de­
veloped market economy countries prefer settlements in courts of third 
countries and maintain that a reference to international arbitration should 
be made in the Code.
3. Evaluation
From this overview of resolved and still disputed issues some substan­
tial conclusions can be drawn.
With regard to the econoMi'c nad/ers it is apparent that /Ac n;a;ordy q/' 
/Ac of the developing countries we? posdwe response. The enu-
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meration of the problems resolved in favour of them is impressively long. 
The provisions of the Code unequivocally promote the goals of the LDCs in 
achieving a better integration of the TNC into their economy, in 
strengthening its contribution to the development plans and policies of the 
country, in shifting the locus of decision from the headquarters of the TNC 
to the local entity and in improving the host state's control over the activ­
ity of the TNC. The provisions on information disclosure and environ­
mental protection deserve special mentioning because of their degree of 
specificity and direct applicability. (FATOUROS, 113) The success of the 
LDCs is proved by the fact that one can not find any significant economic 
issue, either among the impartially resolved, or among the still disputed 
issues.
Basically the same applies to the .soedd ¿s.su,e.s. The LDCs did not have 
to make any concessions. They achieved the codification of the protection 
of their cultural patterns and socio-cultural objectives. This paragraph of 
the Code can be interpreted as creating a shield against cultural imperia­
lism and distortion of consumption patterns — usually called "coca-colon­
ization".
The efforts of the LDCs to eliminate or minimize the interference of the 
TNC in the autonomous <%eci.sio?i luaCiay process of the host country were 
less fruitful. They could not relegate the traditional rules of diplomatic pro­
tection (by substituting it with the Calvo doctrine), they were unable to 
make the developed market economy countries to accept an unqualified 
prohibition of interference by the TNC. The only real progress is the 
reinforcement of the renegotiation principle, even if it is still subject to 
some disagreement of minor importance.
1/oder.s coiieeriiiny die .sorerciyid?/ are die mod disputed. Here the LDCs 
only have one major score, the provision obliging the TNC to comply with 
and contribute to the host country's development plans — as mentioned 
in the economic context. In all the other issues*" the parties are deeply 
entrenched in their respective positions with fairly dim hopes to move 
closer to each other. 117;a/ is die caydauatiou/or dud?
The Code involves a number of disputes which at first sight seem to be 
legal, such as those, concerning the permanent sovereignty of states over 
natural resources, wealth and economic activity; the extent of interference 
by the TNC; the national treatment; conditions and requirements for na­
tionalization; conflicting jurisdictions and the methods of dispute settle­
ment. They all can be subsumed under the heading: does international law 
pose any limit to the freedom of action of a state, i.e. to its sovereignty, and 
if yes, where are these limits. This is very much like the everlasting topic of 
public international lawyers concerning dualistic and monistic solutions in 
the relation between international law and domestic law. Instead of 
becoming overwhelmed by the aboundance of legal treatises let us have 
a glance a t the underlying controversy.
/unuidaMdy or e/iouye, dad i.s die yues/iou. The international law is 
dear to the developed countries because it protects the present state of
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affairs. The LDCs want to modify the law, &ecanse they strive ior a change 
in the world order. ó'on/b'c/.s do no? arise nn'Min l/;e laic, ?Aey are only ?ran.s- 
Jaled into ?Ae "lanynaye", i'n?o ?7;e eonlea? o/* Me Tan*. The role of law is con­
fined to reflecting the solution found on the level of the original conflict. 
The parties must modify their real behaviour, they must achieve a real 
compromise in order to enable the evolution of a legal common denomi­
nator.^
Of course it is not stability or reform per se that the states advocate. 
The status quo in the opinion of most of the developed market economy 
countries serves their interest, whereas the majority of the LDCs is con­
vinced that it is detrimental to them. A closer look at the disputes on the 
permanent sovereignty over natural resources and on nationalization may 
give some insight into the value clashes. Why do developed capitalist 
countries oppose nationalization without promt, adequate and effective 
compensation and the permanent sovereignty principle providing a ground 
for such nationalization? Not because it causes unbearable material 
damage (BURTON, 397)d^ but because d rMnsayains? Meir eaMe.S', it can be 
said, ayain-s? Me;'r ¿'deoJoyy. The refused acts represent wealth redistribution, 
and that is unacceptible for them. I t is well known, that the Western states 
have nothing against income redistribution. They themselves practice it 
through taxation. But wealth redistribution, encroachment on property 
without a compensation of the same market value is unbearable lor them.
Certainly the arguments of the other party, based on a belief in and a 
claim of a more just and equitable world order are not less ideological. 
Hence it seems to be proven that Me /nndawen/a? con/royer.sy — naturally 
unsolvable in this paper —, is p/;do.sop7Aca?.
This point enables a reference to another question, that of the relation 
between the home state and the TNC. 11 is frequently stated that the po­
sition of the developed states is induced by their responsibility for their ju­
ridical entities, that they simply protect the interests of their citizens. 
However, it seems to me, that the alliance between the home state and the 
TNC is not absolute, that the picture is more complicated. The developed 
home states made several concessions in economic matters, which presum­
ably will cause a decrease in the earnings of the TNCs, or at least will 
limit their freedom of action. The developed market economy states only 
became unyielding with respect to matters directly affecting them as states. 
Their primary aim is not to give up anything which they consider as 
part and parcel of their existence as sovereign states. These assets frequ­
ently are symbolic^ goods. Thus the present state of the Code is evidence 
of how MMfA wore di^icnl? d ¿s ?o neyoldde over .synMob'c yoode, raJne.s aw/ 
p7;do.sop7dc n'en'.s, Man oyer 7n?e77ee/na7 or adna? property.
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NOTES
* In order to comply with the terminology of the UN, the expression "transnational 
corporations" will be used to denominate transnational enterprises, multinational companies, 
etc. (Sec also n. (3))
The Draft United Nations Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations appears in 
IIM XX III (1984) No 3. May pp. 626-640 , as reproduced from Report on the Commission 
on Transnational Corporations, Official Records of the Economic and Social Council, 1983, 
Supplement No. 7 (E/1983/17/Rev. 1), Annex II, pp. 1 2 -2 7 .
i n  Me teat /  .Mad cad Mts dra/t  "Me Code".
- The case of the Reagan Administ ration is particular. In its economic propaganda it is 
close to the neoclassical (liberal) school. However, I see no sign of any intention of the Ad­
ministration to reduce the role of the state in the foreign relations, including the protection 
of business interests abroad.
3 "While a political theorist may rightly question the suitability of the whole concept 
of national sovereignty to the maintenance of international order in a world which is both 
capable of self-destruction and daily growing smaller, a practical international program must 
be based on this fundamental fact of life, at least for the immediate future, rather than of 
some form of ideal system." (Wang, 217)
3 More details in: (BAADE, 414-417; WANG, 220-225).
3 The basic documents of the NIEO expressly mention the regulation of the activities 
of the TNC as an aim. Declaration on the Establishment of a Now International Economic 
Order [GA. Res. 3201 (S — VI) of 1 May 1974] in its 4 (g) point; the Programme of Action for 
the Establishment of a New International Economic Order [GA. Res. 3202 (S —VI) of 1 May 
1974] in its section V ;
the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States [GA. Res. 3281 (XXIX) of 12 December 
1974] in Article 2, paragraph 2(b).
3 U. in his valuable article on the need of a new paradigm publishes the
following table: (see p. 16.)
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? A list of ten documents regulating the TNG is fairly modest (GROSSE, 419 — 424) 
compared with other compilations (SAUVANT 404 — 419 and BA ARE 416 — 440).
s This is a crude simplification, but the analysis of the provisions of the Code reveals 
that the absolute state centredness does not leave any room for transnationalism, or struc­
tural dependency thinking. Accordingly most of the LDCs in their policy follow the line 
reflected in the dependence thinking.
By dependence theory one refers to those views which probe and explore the symmetries 
and assymmetries among nation states with the aim of securing symmetry either in the form 
of mutual balanced dependence or in the form of self reliance. It includes that part of the de­
pendencia thinking, which concentrates on any one particular developing country and its 
dependence from concrete core states. At the same time the category "dependence theory" 
should be construed broadly, comprising the ideologies of all those nationalist revolutionary 
regimes which have anticapitalist attitudes. The border between mercantilism and depend­
ence theory is not absolute, a nationalist developing state can well be at odds with its de­
pendent status stemming from the given (capitalistic) world order and attempt to behave 
mercantilistly at the same time.
8 The investigation of the draft and the commentary to it gives the impression, that the 
socialist states usually sided with the developing countries. The NIOCs seem not to have 
taken separate position from the G 77.
'0 The problem of the national treatment, and the quarrel over the methods of dispute 
settlement in the strict sense are "below" and "above" sovereignty. However in both cases 
the freedom of action of the state is the core of the issue, so they will be included in the 
analysis.
" To be somewhat more precise and paydue tribute to the properpotentialoflawlhave 
to add a differentiation between our case and the typical legal disputes in the national law. 
The model presented here applies to cases when the legal system as a whole, or at least a ma­
jor subsystem of it, is challenged. Then the solution must come from outside the law, and the 
legal formulation will only sanctify it.
However, in most of the domestic law disputes in local courts, the parties do not chal­
lenge the validity of the law as such. Thus, in regular civil and penal law cases the law and 
the administrator of justice has a genuine role.
'2 For the determinant role of data gathering, compare two articles, published in the 
same year on cross national analysis of expropriations. (See BURTON and see KOBRIN) 
'8 FatoMros writes concerning the disputes over nationalization: "The issue has become 
symbolic of differing perceptions of appropriate state conduct; like many another symbol, it 
has lost to some extent its link to reality." (FATOUROS, 116 — 117)
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GELÖSTE UND UMSTRITTENE PROBLEME 
IN DEM VERHALTENSKODEX DER VN FÜR 
DIE TRANSNATIONALEN UNTERNEHMEN
DR. BOLDIZSÁR NAGY
Die Streiten um das Verhaltenskodex der VN für die transnationalen Unternehmen 
können nicht in die Rahmen der Nord-Süd Dialog eingedrängt werden. Die Ursache dafür 
ist dass der „Süd" nicht als ein einheitlicher Block aufgefasst werden kann.
Das Entwurf beinhaltet die noch streitigen und schon angenommenen Artikel. Diese 
können in vier Klassen geteilt werden : ekonomische, soziale, die Entscheidungsmacht und 
letzten die Souveränität betreffenden.
Die Lösung in den ersten drei Klassen wiederspiegeln die Ansprüche der Entwicklungs­
länder. Die heftigsten Kontroversen betreffen die Fragen der Souveränität (Nationalisation, 
Streitschlichtung). Die Erklärung könnte sein, dass die Staaten über die Fragen die ihren 
wirtschaftliche Interessen unmittelbar betreffen leichter zur Einigung kommen, als über 
deren die nur scheinbar rechtliche Natur haben, in der Wirklichkeit aber den Zusammenstoss 
ideologischer Wertordnungen verdecken.
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СПОРНЫЕ И РАЗРЕШЁННЫЕ ВОПРОСЫ В ПРОЕКТЕ КОДЕКСА 
О О Н -а О ПОВЕДЕНИИ ТРАНСНАЦИОНАЛЬНЫХ КОРПОРАЦИИ
БОЛДИЖАР НАДЬ
Обсуждение проекта кодекса в ООН-е о поведении транснациональных кор­
порации не могут быть ввести в рамки конфликта «Север) и «Юго. Причиной этого 
среди других является то, что нельзя читать «Юп) единым блоком. Проект кодекса 
заключает в себе еще спорные и уже принятые статьи. Они могут быть классифи­
цированы в четыре класс: связанные экономическими, социальными проблемами, 
вопросами власти внесить решено и суверенитетом. Во первых трёх классах решение 
отражает запросы развивающихся стран. Споры связаны суверенитетом (нац­
ионализация, разрешение споров) являются острейшими. Обьясиение этого 
наверно то, что государства договариваются легче о тех вопросах которые связаны 
непосредственно экономическими вопросами, но не о тех которые только по-внди- 
мому юридические, но действительно отражают конфликта идеологических цен­
ностных систем.
